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INTRODUCTION

The U.S. domestic airline market is one of the very few American
industries which, since its inception, has remained tightly closed to any
and all foreign competition.1 Although the reasons for this closed-door
policy are mostly geopolitical, the role of economic protectionism as the
prime determinant has not heretofore been comprehensively examined.
Often cited as a reason for excluding all foreign competition is the
refusal of foreign countries to allow American carriers to compete with
the domestic carriers of those foreign countries. 2 The U.S. Policy of excluding all foreign competition from domestic air markets is a legacy of
the protectionist policies of U.S. Government Depression era policies.
Those policies in turn found their roots in the successful attempts by the
large railroad cartels during the late 1800's to enlist the aid of the U.S.
3
Government to fix prices and exclude competition.
Fierce competition in the railroad industry in the late 1800's
prompted the most powerful railroads to form cartels in order to fix
prices and exclude competition, thereby insuring high oligopoly profits. 4
Particularly irksome to the most powerful railroads were the new industry entrants who offered lower prices to consumers, thereby taking business from the entrenched railroads. 5 Even more alarming was the
practice of some members of the railroad cartels to "cheat" by offering
lower prices in order to win customers. 6
When the Sherman Antitrust Act threatened to made oligopoly and
monopoly price fixing and collusion illegal, the railroad cartel finally con1. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(15) (2003); 49 U.S.C. § 41102(a) (2000); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-34R, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN U.S. AIRLINES 1-4 (2003).
2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 1, at 7-9.

3.

ANN

F. FRIEDLAENDER,

THE DILEMMA OF FREIGHT TRANSPORT REGULATION

2 (1969)

(citing generally SOLON JUSTUS BUCK, THE GRANGER MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF AGRICUL-

TURAL

ORGANIZATION AND ITS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL MANIFESTATIONS

1870-1880

(2nd impression 1933); LEE BENSON, MERCHANTS, FARMERS, & RAILROADS: RAILROAD REGULATION AND NEW YORK POLITICS
STANDARD OIL COMPANY

4.

1850-1887 (1955);

IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE

(1904)).

See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 7 (Norton Library

1970) (1965).
5. See id. at 7-11.
6. See generally Robert M. Hardaway, Transportation Deregulation (1976-1984): Turning

the Tide, 14 TRANSP. L.J. 101, 112-118 (1985) (discussing the politics of railroad regulation).

20071

Of Cabbages and Cabotage

cluded that the only way to insure discipline from within and to immunize
themselves from criminal charges of price fixing, was to get the government to pass a law which not only condoned price-fixing by enshrining
the practice into law, but which actually obligated the government to do
the dirty work of fixing prices for them. 7 The result was the Interstate
Commerce Act (ICC Act), 8 and the founding of the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC), under which the government itself set prices on behalf of the railroad cartels. 9 By making it illegal for competitors to offer
lower prices to customers, the ICC Act effectively broke the backs of any
competitor who tried to enter the industry by offering more efficient or
10
economical service.
The ICC Act more than others epitomized Stigler's first law of economics: "(E)very industry or occupation that has enough political power
to utilize the state will seek to control entry."" The final victory of the
railroad cartel was marked by the passage of the Hepburn Act of 1906
which further tightened the power of government to fix prices on behalf
of the cartels. 12 This prompted George Perkins to write to his boss,
J.P.Morgan, "the Hepburn bill is going to work out for the ultimate and
great good of the railroads. There is no question but that rebating (offering lower prices) has been dealt a death blow."'1 3 The New York press
noted that the railroads themselves had written the law and "that explains
why the railroad lobbies did not raise a note of public or private protest
against the Hepburn bill in the House."'14 The Hepburn act set the stage
for similar law fixing not only prices, but routes and rights of entry in the
motor carrier and airline industries.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 went further than any of the previous transportation regulatory laws by not only fixing prices, but also by
establishing virtually absolute barriers to entry by competitors. 15 Al7. See KOLKO, supra note 4, at 26 (citing Memorandum from Joseph Nimmo, Jr. on the
Present Status of the R.R. Problem (Apr. 15, 1899) (on file with the Library of the Bureau of
R.R. Econ.)).
8. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 879 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
9. Id. at 529-30.
10. Id. at 529.
11. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMr. SCi.
3, 5 (1971).
12. Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 584-89 (1906) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 45 U.S.C.) (applicable to express companies and sleeping car companies, providing
specific fines for rebating and a two year prison term for violations, stipulated that a complain
from a shipper or railroad could be remedy by the ICC determining "just and reasonable rates");
KOLKO, supra note 4, at 144-45.
13. KOLKO, supra note 4, at 148.
14. KOLKO, supra note 4, at 139 (quoting N.Y. PRESS, Mar. 16, 1906).

15. Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938); See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey,
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though new entrants could, in theory, receive permission to compete with
established carriers by persuading the civil aeronautics board to issue a
certificate of "public convenience or necessity,"' 16 in practice the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) succeeded in preventing a single competitor
from entering the airline industry during its heavy-handed reign (19381975).17 Professor Paul Dempsey has observed that this excessively rigid
regulatory scheme established by the CAB between 1938 and 1975 allowed the creation of an effective oligopoly composed the five largest
trunk line carriers1 8 - this despite the fact that the airline industry itself
expanded by 23,800 percentage points during this same period. 19
Building on the success of the railroad cartel in enlisting the power
of government to fix prices and exclude competition, the airline industry
succeeded in establishing itself as a price-fixing cartel thriving on high
fares and immunity from competition of any kind. In 1962, President John
F. Kennedy demanded in his transportation message "greater reliance on
the forces of competition and less reliance on the restraints of regulation."' 20 It was clear that the price-fixing and competition-excluding laws
harmed consumers and workers alike.
The final straw was the revelation by the 1975 Kennedy hearings in
Congress that regulated air fares were 40% to 100% higher than they
would be without government price-fixing on behalf of entrenched carriers,2 1 thereby costing consumers up to $3.5 billion in excess fares.2 2 The
government's end to sponsored price fixing and exclusion of competition
was the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)2 3 which placed "maximum reliance on competitive market forces."' 24 Everyone enjoyed the
The Rise and Fall of the Civil Aeronautics Board - Opening Wide the Floodgates of Entry, 11
TRANSP. L.J. 91, 181 (1979) (discussing the impacts of airline deregulation on market entry by
small carriers and aviation entrepreneurs).
16. See Dempsey, supra note 15, at 93.
17. Dempsey, supra note 15, at 115.
18. Dempsey, supra note 15, at 109, 115, 131, 173, 174.
19. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 206 (1982).
20. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 3, at vii:
In particular, the following inefficiencies and inequities [of regulation] were singled out [by
President Kennedy]: the dulling of managerial initiative; the inability of carriers to divest themselves of traffic that fails to cover costs; ... the substitution of cost-increasing service competition for cost-reducing rate competition; . .. and, finally, the decline of the common carrier
relative to private and exempt carriage.
21. Oversight of the CAB Practicesand Procedures:Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Administrative Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 454 (1975)

[hereinafter Kennedy Hearings] (statement of Dr. William A. Jordan, Professor of Managerial
Economics, York University).
22. Id. at 457.
23. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
24.

PAUL BIEDERMAN, THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY: END OF AN ERA 80 (1982).
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benefits of competition. Consumers enjoyed reduced fares, while workers received an expanded industry with many more jobs. Only three
years after deregulation eleven newly formed airlines providing jet ser25
vice had entered the U.S. Airline market.
By 2000, however, disturbing trends toward renewed concentration
in the industry were evident. This trend was exacerbated in part by lax
antitrust policies of the U.S. Government which permitted anti-competitive mergers and consolidations, and partly by political forces placed on
the government to protect airlines, particularly large ones, from failure
and the consequences of their inefficiency. Lax bankruptcy laws allowed
failing, inefficient, and bloated carriers to continue operating, often with
little prospect of ultimate success or economic viability, instead of allowing those firms to simply dissolve and allow the process of bankruptcy
to redistribute its assets to more efficient and cost productive firms.
The most important cause of the reconsolidation of the airline industry has been the continued oligopolization of airport resources. 26 Deregulation in the "air," in the form of freedom to charge market fares and
choose the most efficient routes and schedules, was never followed up
with deregulation on the "ground" - that is with access to airport gates
and slots. Long term leases with airport authorities assured entrenched
trunk lines of access to scarce gates, while landing rights and "slots"
awarded without cost to favored carriers during the regulatory years
(1938-1975) provided ground right monopolies and a barrier to new
27
entry.
Since I testified before Congress on September 10, 198528 to urge
that the government condemn airport gates and slots and open them up
to fair and open bidding by all carriers, including new entrants, little has
been done to open up access to airport resources. Without such access,
new entrants are denied entry to the market no less than by the arbitrary
exclusion policies of the CAB during its regulatory reign.
While opening up airport resources to competitors and new entrants
would go far in achieving the ultimate goals of the ADA, true economic
deregulation requires that such a policy be combined with opening up the
25. OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, CIVIL AERONAUTICS BD., COMPETITION AND THE AIRLINES: AN EVALUATION OF DEREGULATION 125 (1982) [hereinafter cited as CAB Report].
26. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-97-4, AIRLINE DEREGULATION: BARRIERS TO ENTRY CONTINUE TO LIMIT COMPETITION IN SEVERAL KEY DOMESTIC MARKETS

3, 22

(1996) [hereinafter Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets].

27. Id. at 4-7, 9-10.
28. Government Policieson the Transfer of Operating Rights Granted by the Federal Government, ParticularlyCertificates of Public Convenience and Necessity and Airport Slots: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. On Aviation of the H. Comm. on Public Works and Transportation,99th
Cong. 175-82 (1985) (statement of Robert M. Hardaway, Acting Director of the Transportation
Law Journal, College of Law Denver University).

Transportation Law Journal

[Vol. 34:1

domestic market to foreign competition. With a stroke of the pen, the
trend toward reconsolidation and oligopolization of the domestic airline
market could be reversed and the benefits of free trade and competition
once again enjoyed by the traveling public.
This article attempts to show that the economic advantages of free
trade in the airline industry is no less than other industries, but also that
the reasons posited for the rejection of free trade do not stand up to comprehensive analysis. Proposed herein is the adoption of "cabotage," defined by the Standard Dictionary of the English language as "air
'29
transport of passengers and goods within the same national territory.
The definition adopted by International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) at the Chicago Convention 30 is, "Each state shall have the right
to refuse permission to the aircraft of other contracting states to take on
its territory passengers, mail, and cargo destined for another point within
its territory. ' 31 Current international agreements, often misleadingly described as "open skies" agreements," provide only for reciprocal rights of
U.S. and foreign governments to share international routes.32 Under
such an agreement a carrier is permitted to carry passengers from country
X to city A in country Y, and to carry some of those same passengers
from city A to city B in country Y. These agreements do not permit a
foreign carrier to pick up passengers in city A and carry them to city B.
Part II briefly reviews the regulatory history of the U.S. domestic
airline industry. Part III reviews the causes of the current trend to reconsolidation of the domestic airline industry, including the contribution of
antitrust and bankruptcy policies. Part IV describes the current state of
cabotage and examines the political and geopolitical reasons most often
posited for resisting its adoption, including the resistance of labor-paradoxically the resistance of both domestic as well as foreign labor. Finally,
part V applies basic economic principles to show that that adoption of
cabotage would lower fares, increase productivity as well as the GNP of
countries participating in cabotage agreements, foster competition, and
achieve the goals set forth in the ADA.
29. The International Flight Information Manual, Appendix 4: Terminology (2004), http://
www.faa.gove/ats/aat/ifirn/ac9l-70a04.htm.
30. Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180,
T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
31. International Flight Information Manual, supra note 29.
32. Open skies is the common term for a liberalized form of bilateral agreement between
nations. Under open skies, cabotage and foreign ownership are still restricted but pricing, scheduling, inter-airline cooperation restrictions are eliminated or greatly reduced. See e.g., Gautam
Gowrisankaran, Competition and Regulation in the Airline Industry, in 2002 FRBSF Economic
Letter 01, 1; In the Matter of the Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings,
Order No. 91-1-41 (Dep't of Transp. Jan. 23, 1991) (order modifying conditions).
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II.

REGULATION TO DEREGULATION OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

A.

REGULATION

In 1938, Congress first regulated the fledgling airline industry by
forming the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), 33 on the theory that strict
regulation was necessary to protect airlines from "excessive competition."'34 The CAB's chief tool of regulation was to sanction and indeed
sponsor the practice of price-fixing, 35 a practice that is criminal when
done by private enterprises, 36 and difficult in any case to carry out when
businesses attempt to engage in it on their own without the benefit of
government enforcement. 37 The CAB also tightly restricted rates, routes,
and, most notably, entry into the market. 38 The CAB's anti-competitive
policies prevented even a single major trunk carrier from entering the
industry during the 40 years of its ironhanded rule.39 This virtual "Berlin
Wall" to entry was enforced even as the industry itself grew by 23,800
percentage points. 40 As Professor Dempsey observed, "[t]he excessively
rigid regulatory scheme established by the Civil Aeronautics Board...
allowed the creation of an effective oligopoly...-41
Despite the obvious harm to the consumer caused by the CAB's policies, 42 proponents of the CAB felt that the policies were justified to allow the airlines to reap oligopoly profits.43 If airline profit was the goal,
33. U.S. GEN.

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

GAO/RCED-90-102,

AIRLINE

COMPETITION:

12 (1990). The
CAA (Civil Aeronautics Act) was the predecessor to the CAB. Id.
34. Regulation of Transportationof Passengers and Property by Aircraft: Hearings on S. 2
and S. 17 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 75th Cong. 67 (1937)
HIGHER FARES AND REDUCED COMPETITION AT CONCENTRATED AIRPORTS

(statement of Edgar Gorrell, Colonel) cited in Dempsey, supra note 15, at 101; see also Aviation

Hearings on H.R. 5234 and H.R. 4652 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong. 53 (1937); see also Westwood and Bennett, A Footnote to the Legislative History of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 and Afterward, 42 NOTRE DAME L.REV. 309, 320
(1967).
35.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33, at 21.
PAUL S. DEMPSEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIR TRANSPORTATION: FOUNDATIONS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY 275-85 (1997).

36.

37. Id.
38. CAB REPORT, supra note 25, at 33. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) through its
power to grant certificates of "public convenience or necessity" utilized a test that placed the
burden on applicants for certification to show new entry was in the public interest and would not
harm an incumbent airline. Since a new entrant had no proven track record to distinguish its
merits, it suffered a significant disadvantage in pressing its case. See Robert M. Hardaway, The
FAA "Buy-Sell" Slot Rule: Airline Deregulation at the Crossroads,52 J. AIR L. & COMM. 2, 11
(1986).
39. Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in DeregulatedMarkets: Theory, Firm Strategy,
& Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 425 (1987).
40. See Dempsey, supra note 15, at 206.
41. See Dempsey, supra note 15, at 206.

42. See generally Levine, supra note 39.
43. See generally Levine, supra note 39.
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however, the CAB failed miserably. 44 Indeed, what profits the airline did
earn were attributable to technological advances 45such as the development
of the jet engine rather than economic policies.
But even the exponential rise in aircraft efficiency resulting from the
advent of jet aircraft and improved technology did not appreciably serve
to re-capitalize the industry. Potential profits were eaten up by equally
exponential rising costs, particularly labor costs. 46 Shielded from competitive pressures, and secure in their cozy regulated environment, the airlines had no incentive to resist cost inflation. 47 The CAB's policies
allowed the airlines to simply use cost increases as the basis for requesting fare increases. 48 There was little cause for the airlines to fear competition from new efficient, cost-cutting airlines since any cost savings could
not be reflected in lower fares. All fares were price-fixed by the CAB
49
across the board.
As a result, the CAB reported that during the period of airline regulation, which ended in 1978, typists in the airline industry received fortyone percent more than their counterparts in deregulated industries, computer operators thirty-eight percent more, freight agents fifty-eight percent, and even janitors received eighty-two percent more than their
deregulated counterparts. 50 Indeed, what was remarkable about the airline industry under CAB regulation was not that the industry failed to
earn even allowable returns on investment, but that it survived at all.
B.

DEREGULATION

President John Kennedy began the dismantling process in his Transportation message of 1962 when he called for "greater reliance on the
44. CAB REPORT, supra note 25.
45. See Hardaway, supra note 6, at 137; See also ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, AIRPORT REGULATION, LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1991);

PAUL S. DEMPSEY ET AL., AVIATION LAW AND

REGULATION § 1.05 1-12 (1992); See also PAUL W. MACAVOY, JOHN W. SNOW, REGULATION OF
PASSENGER FARES AND COMPETITION AMONG AIRLINES 3 (1977); See also CAB REPORT, supra
note 25.

46. Levine, supra note 39, at 405.
47. Levine, supra note 39, at 405.
48. See Hendricks, Regulation, Deregulation, and Collective Bargaining in Airlines, 34 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 67 (1980).
49. U.S.

GEN.

ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

GAO/RCED-96-79,

AIRLINE

DEREGULATION:

CHANGES IN AiRFARES, SERVICE & SAFETY AT SMALL, MEDIUM-SIZED AND LARGE COMMUNITIES

12 (Apr. 1996).

50. CAB REPORT, supra note 25, at 114. Since deregulation, airline employee compensation continues to exceed the average for most other industries. In 1984, average compensation
per employee was $41,928 and by 1994 that figure had increased to $57,355. AIR TRANSPORT
ASSOCIATION, THE ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE U.S. SCHEDULED AIRLINE INDUSTRY 11 (1995)

[hereinafter cited as 1995 Air Transport Association Report].
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forces of competition and less reliance on the restraints of regulation. ''5 1
In 1975, the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the CAB (The Kennedy Hearings) revealed that regulated fares were forty to one-hundred
percent higher than the free market would have set, 52 and that airline
regulation had effectively bilked consumers out of $3.5 billion in excess
fares. 53 Empirical comparisons with unregulated airfares on intrastate
routes in states like Texas and California as well as economic data sup54
ported the hearing's findings.
Although anyone familiar with the airline industry could have predicted these revelations, they were nevertheless alarming to a traveling
public conditioned to believe that airline regulation had been in its best
interest. Had the perpetrators of such price-fixing been anyone other
than a bureaucratic agency acting under the protection of law, they would
surely have been the subject of criminal charges. 55 Congress passed the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 sixteen years after President Kennedy's
first call for deregulation. 56 The ADA ended the CAB's draconian rule
by easing entry restrictions, and allowing carriers to choose their own
routes and set their own fares.5 7 For the first time in forty years, an airline's success was to depend on its ability to provide the best service at
the lowest fares 58 - not on its political influence. 59
The 1983 report by the American Air Transport Association
(AATA) revealed that, had the industry not been deregulated, the CAB
Standard Industry Fare would have allowed for fare increases of sixtyseven percent. 60 Instead, fares in real terms declined dramatically during
this period 61 despite staggering 105% fuel increases during the period of
March 1979-March 1980 alone. 62 In the regulatory period between 1960
and 1969 the advent of jet aircraft reduced costs per passenger mile by
twenty-one percent, but fares declined only seven percent. 63
51. FRIEDLAENDER, supra note 3, at vii; see also supra text accompanying note 20.
52. Kennedy Hearings, supra note 21, at 454 (testimony of Dr. William A. Jordan); Theodore E. Keeler, Airline Regulation and Market Performance,3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. ScI. 399,
421 (1972) (study indicated price markup between 45 and 84 percent).
53. Kennedy Hearings,supra note 21, at 457 (testimony of Dr. William A. Jordan).
54. STAFF OF S. SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., REPORT ON CIVIL AERONATUTICS BOARD PRACTICES

AND PROCEDURES 452 (Comm. Print 1975); See also Hardaway supra note 6, at 136.
55. DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 36, at 275-80.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See Hardaway supra note 6, at 136-37.
See Hardaway supra note 6, at 137.
See Hardaway supra note 6, at 137.
See Hardaway supra note 6, at 137.
See Hardaway supra note 6, at 143-44.
Hardaway supra note 6, at 144.
Hardaway supra note 6, at 144.
See Hardaway supra note 6, at 138.
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In addition to deceasing fares, deregulation allowed many new airlines to begin service throughout the country. 6 4 By 1981 more than
eleven newly formed airlines had entered the industry. 65 Market share of
new entrants more than tripled between 1978 and 1983,66 while that of
the major carriers decreased proportionately. By 1984, airline productivity had skyrocketed, the number of passenger miles almost doubled 67 and
in the first two years of deregulation the number of employees in the
industry increased by over 30,000.68 Over the first five years of deregulation local service employment even increased by 13,000.69 Airline profits
also increased. In early 1984, the Air Transport's chief economist reported an industry profit for the fourth quarter of 1983 of almost half a
70
billion dollars.
But consumers were the greatest beneficiaries of deregulation. By
eliminating costly and inefficient cross-subsidization, 7 1 deregulation gave
airlines the incentive to use appropriately sized aircraft for service to
small communities, 72 while at the same time increasing service to those
communities. 7 3 During the seventeen years prior to deregulation, the
CAB's policy of subsidizing service to small communities and requiring
airlines to take losses on such routes had induced recalcitrant airlines to
eliminate service to over 173 communities, devastating those communities. 74 Between 1970 and 1975, airlines cut small community flights by
over twenty-five percent.7 5 By 1983, however, after five years of deregulation, there were more city-pair markets receiving non-stop service than
in 1978.76 A study conducted by Graham and Kaplan in 1982 concluded
that "on balance, every class of city is benefiting from the better-integrated service network, either through increased flights or more direct
service to major cities, and the beneficiaries include the smaller communities (which were considered vulnerable to service losses from
64. Hardaway supra note 6, at 141.
65. Hardaway supra note 6, at 141
66. See Hardaway supra note 6, at 143.
67. MELVIN A. BRENNER, JAMES 0. LEET & ELIHU SCHOTr, AIRLINE DEREGULATION 18
(Eno Foundation for Transportation 1985). Table 4 indicated that between 1978 and 1983, trunk
revenue-passenger miles increased 7.1 percent. Locals increased 91.5 percent; intrastate increased 123.7 percent.
68. See Hardaway supra note 6, at 140.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 146- 47.
See Hardaway supra note 6, at 147.
See id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 147.
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Even safety statistics showed dramatic improvement under deregulation. The National Transportation Safety Board statistics revealed in 1982
that fatal crashes per 100,000 take-offs had declined dramatically from .10
in 1978 to .08 in 1982.78 By almost any measure, deregulation was an
unmitigated success.
III.
A.

AIRLINE INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION AND ITS CAUSES

THE CURRENT STATE OF AIRLINE INDUSTRY CONCENTRATION

The heady first years following deregulation were not to last. Today,
at most hub airports, one or two airlines dominate the competition and
control a large majority of the flights. 79 For example, one study shows
that at Chicago-O'Hare Airport, United Airlines and American Airlines
each operate about 40 percent of the flights; and Delta Airlines operates
over 70% of the flights in Atlanta.8 0 In the late 1990s, approximately
two-thirds of the U.S.'s fifty largest airports showed an "unprecedented
degree of concentration in the airline industry." 8' Concentration also affects the entrance of new airlines and the low cost benefits they offer.
Significantly, "[i]n the last four years of the Twentieth Century, only two
new entrants began service."'8 2 Concentration has had a resoundingly
negative effect on consumers in the way of higher fares. Domination of
airport traffic by one or two carriers tends to produce higher fares compared to airports where traffic is less concentrated. In non-competitive
markets, customers pay forty percent more than consumers with choices
between legacy and low-cost carriers. 83 The 1st quarter 2000 Domestic
Airline Fares Consumer Report demonstrates the effect of a low-fare
competitor's presence on average fares:
77. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Graham and Kaplan, Airline Deregulation is Working, AEI J.
Gov'T & Soc., 26-27 (May-June 1982)).
78. Id. at 148.
79. Rob O'Dell, Hub Airports Stifle Competition, Panel Told, ATLANTA J. CONST. June 15,
2000, available at http://archives.californiaaviation.org/airport/msg08824.html.
80. Jan K. Brueckner, Reducing Airport Congestion:A partiallyself-correctingproblem?, 25
U. ILL. INST. OF Gov'T & PUB. AFF. POL'Y F. 5 (2002).
81.

Aviation Competition Enhancement Act of 1997: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Com-

merce, Sci. and Transp. 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Edward P. Faberman, Executive Director, Air Carrier Association of America) at http://commerce.senate.govhearings/1028fabe.htm.
82. Paul S. Dempsey, Predation, Competition & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline
Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 690 (2002).

83. Airline Mergers and their Effect on American Consumers: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Comm., Trade and Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. 14-16 (2001) (statement of Rep. Peter Peter
A. DeFazio, Member, House Aviation Subcomm.).
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FARE COMPARISON: COMPARABLE MARKETS WITH AND WITHOUT
84
Low-FARE COMPETITION

Origin
Atlanta, GA
St. Louis, MO
Cincinnati, OH

Destination

Nonstop
Distance

Passengers
per Day

Avg
One-Way
Fare

Low-Fare
Carrier
AirTran

Dayton, OH

432

594

$126

Indianapolis, IN

432

430

$242

Detroit, MI

440

1,008

$ 83

Minneapolis, MN

449

450

$259

Philadelphia, PA

507

341

$278

Kansas City, MO

539

166

$156

Southwest

Vanguard

In 1996, the General Accounting Office (GAO) identified the cities
of Minneapolis-St. Paul, Detroit, Cincinnati, Charlotte, Newark, and
Pittsburgh as homes to the airports of major airline hubs being most dominated by a single airline resulting in higher fares. 85 Northwest Airlines
dominated Detroit, and Minneapolis-St. Paul. 86 Northwest's average hub
87
market share was the highest average of any other U.S. major carrier.
The correlation between dominance and higher fares is demonstrated
with Northwest's Detroit-Boston city pair.88 In an airfare analysis between June, 1996 and June, 1997, while Northwest controlled ninety percent of the traffic between the two cities, fares rose 127%.89 Altogether,
on twenty-five routes with the largest average fares, Northwest was the
dominant carrier on seven of them.90 Northwest's control of the Minneapolis-St. Paul was such that, "before Sun Country's entry [into the market], Northwest had no competition on twelve of its busiest routes." 9 1
Delta Airlines also has three hubs, one of which is Cincinnati, another
airport identified by the GAO as being highly dominated with increased
84. U.S. DEP'T. OF TRANSP., OFF. OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR AVIAnON AND INT'L
AFFAIRS, DOMESTIC AVIATION SERIES, DOMINATED HUB FARES (2001).

85. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26.
86. Paul S. Dempsey, Antitrust Law and Policy in Transportation:Monopoly is the Name of
the Game, 21 GA. L. REV. 505, 512 (1987).
87. Id. The airline dominates its hub airports more than any other U.S. carrier, controlling
an average of 74.8% of the gates. Northwest's strongest hold over airport facilities is at Minneapolis-St. Paul; dominating 79.5 % of the gates and 82.2% of the traffic. At Detroit, figures show

Northwest controlling eighty-eight percent of the gates with a market share of close to eighty
percent.
88. Donna Rosato, Flying Into Pockets of Pain: How Hub Airports Keep Fares High, USA
TODAY, Feb. 23, 1998 at 01B.
89. Id. An analysis of 17.3 million airline tickets purchased at hub airports showed growing
monopolies have led to steeper prices, with hub fliers paying fare increases three times as high as
all fliers.

90. Id.
91. Paul S. Dempsey, PredatoryPractices & Monopolization in the Airline Industry: A Case
Study of Minneapolis/St. Paul, 29 TRANSP. L. J. 129, 163 (2002).
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fares. Delta's Cincinnati operations with ninety-two percent of passenger
control have been called a "near monopoly" and maintain the third highest fares in the nation. 92 Delta also controls five out of the twenty-five
93
routes with the largest average fare increases.
Two of the other hub airports listed by the GAO are under the domination of U.S. Airways. 94 The two airports are Charlotte with ninety-one
percent passenger control and Pittsburgh with eighty-nine percent. 95 The
last hub airport identified by the GAO falls under the control of Continental Airlines with fifty-four percent of Newark passengers. 96 Continental's largest hub 97 however, is located at Houston's Bush Intercontinental
98
Airport with eighty percent of the traffic.
This type of domination makes price competition among the major
carriers virtually nonexistent at hub airports. 99 For instance, at Dallas-Ft.
Worth, American Airlines' hub, American, Delta and Continental collectively control ninety percent of the market to San Francisco with the average business fares within $170 of each other. The start-up carrier,
Vanguard, offered service to San Francisco, carrying less than five percent
of the traffic and a fare $300 less. 1°°
B.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE HUB-AND-SPOKE

SYSTEM

How did the airline industry get so concentrated? One reason is the
emergence of the hub-and-spoke system.
Prior to deregulation, the airline industry used a linear route system,
where passengers largely flew directly from one destination to their ultimate destination. This system was seen as inefficient and exacerbated the
problem of excess capacity. 10 1 When given the freedom to self-regulate,
the industry responded by reconfiguring the linear system into a hub-and92. Rick Van Sant, Delta's 'Near Monopoly' Can't Go On, Expert Says, CINCINNATI
POST, Apr. 7, 1998 at 17A. Delta's other two hubs are located in Salt Lake City, with seventysix percent of passenger traffic; and, Atlanta with eighty percent of passenger traffic. Id. In a one
year period while Delta controlled fifty-nine percent of passenger traffic between Atlanta and
Miami, fares rose thirty-nine percent. Rosato, supra note 88.
93. Rosato, supra note 88. Out of the twenty-five routes, United dominates six. Id. United
operates its hub out of Denver with seventy percent of the traffic. Sant, supra note 92, at 17A.
94. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 9.
95. Sant, supra note 92, at 17A.
96. Sant, supra note 92, at 17A.
97. Charles Boisseau, Hub Across the Hudson, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 19, 1998 at 1.
Continental's Summer, 1998 schedule indicates 503 daily flights out of Houston, twenty-three
percent more than the airline's Newark operations. Id.
98. Sant, supra note 92, at 17A.
99. Rosato, supra note 88, at 01B.
100. Rosato, supra note 88, at 01B.
101. GEORGE WILLIAMS, THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY AND THE IMPACT OF DEREGULATION 18
(Revised ed., Ashgate Publishing Limited 1996) (1993).
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spoke network,1 02 whereby "feeder traffic" could be brought in through
regional spokes to a large central hub airport. 0 3 Such a network allowed
more connections between cities than would have been possible with the
linear route structure.104 The hub-and-spoke system was also touted as
providing the airlines with economies of scale by concentrating their resources and allowing better utilization of aircraft and crew. 10 5 Further, it
was hoped the system would ease the problem of excess capacity by carrying passengers with different origins and destinations on the same aircraft, resulting in higher passenger loads on routes radiating from the
06
hub.1
Despite its apparent advantages, the hub-and-spoke network has not
been shown to be more efficient than the linear route system.' 0 7 Studies
have indicated that considerably more fuel, pilot time, airline maintenance and the like are expended in transferring the same passenger from
point A to point B under the hub-and-spoke system than under a linear
08
route system.'
Regardless of whether or not the hub-and-spoke system actually is
more efficient, the major carriers soon realized that the system has other
inherent advantages. Prior to deregulation, "no single airline accounted
for more than fifty percent of gates, enplanements or takeoffs and landings at any major airport."' 1 9 However, under the hub-and-spoke system
many simultaneous departures and arrivals are made throughout the day,
allowing a single large airline to control multiple gates and concourses,11 0
and even to establish exclusive use rights to a terminal. 1 Employing
such strategies at the hubs as long-term leases, 112 majority-in-interest
102. Robert M. Hardaway & Paul S. Dempsey, Airlines, Airports and Antitrust: A Proposed
Strategy for Enhanced Competition, 58 J AIR LAW & COM. 455, 465-71 (1993).

Among the

developments that took place were the adoption of marketing practices that made it difficult for
potential competitors to challenge the dominating carrier; and many new entrants and some
original carriers merged or went out of business. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33,
at 24.
103. CONSUMER UNION, The big trouble with air travel (Why fares are headed up and service

down.) CONSUMER REP. 53, 3 (June 1988).
104. WILLIAMS, supra note 101, at 14-15, 19.
105. WILLIAMS, supra note 101, at 18.
106. WILLIAMS, supra note 101, at 18.
107. CONG. OF THE U.S., CONG. BUDGET OFI'CE, FIN. U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's 8-11
(Apr. 1984).
108. Paul S. Dempsey, Airlines in Turbulence: Strategiesfor Survival, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 15, 33-

38 (1995).
109. Hardaway & Dempsey, supra note 102. at 471.
110. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFCE, supra note 33, at 12.
111.

Id. at 25. This is due to limits on airport capacity and the size of the air travel market.

Id.
112. Hardaway, supra note 38, at 20. Many long term airline gate leases were, to a large
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clauses, 113 and anti-competitive airport scheduling committees," 4 the incumbent airlines severely restricted the access of new players, even in an
otherwise deregulated industry.
These barriers to entry continue to stifle
115
growth and competition.
Hub-and-spoke consolidation also has a negative effect on consumers. While the advent of deregulation provided pricing benefits for consumers,11 6 these benefits were short term. For example, the New York
Times observed that "[p]assengers who live in a hub city and begin their
flight there end up paying higher fares, in some cases 50 percent more
17
than they would had deregulation not occurred.""
Closing an airline hub can have dramatic effects for travelers as well
as discount and legacy airlines." 8 When US Airways announced in 2004
that it would cease using Pittsburgh International Airport as a hub, "local
travel increased sharply."" 9 Five discount airlines quickly began offering
service, and existing legacy carriers increased service.1 20 Even though
this change has meant fewer connecting passengers at the airport, the
number of passengers who begin trips in Pittsburgh increased 12% in
September 2005 from the previous year. 12' Fares are cheaper as a whole
thanks to what Kent George, the executive director of the Allegheny
County Airport Authority, dubs "[t]he good old American free-market
extent, negotiated prior to deregulation; therefore, entrance into the market is regulated from

the grave. Id. at 19.
113. Hardaway, supra note 38, at 19-20.
In many airport leases, signatory carriers are given certain rights of approval of airport
decision making on specified matters, through what is commonly called a "majority-in-interest"
clause. The clause is so named because specified airport proposals must be approved by the

signatory carriers constituting a "majority-in-interest." The definition of a majority-in-interest
varies from lease to lease, but is usually cast in terms of a specified percentage of enplanements
or operations, such as 60% percent of passengers or operations. Report of the Airport Access
Task Force: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Comm. on
Public Works and Transportation H. R., 98th Cong. 59 (1983) [hereinafter Airport Access

Report].
114. See Airport Access Report, supra note 113, at 82. They concluded that airport scheduling committees tend to "protect the rights of existing carriers and make the admission of new
carriers to the community serving the airport more difficult." Id.;
115. Hardaway & Dempsey, supra note 102, at 479-80.
116. Paul S. Dempsey, Predation, Competition, & Antitrust Law: Turbulence in the Airline
Industry; 52 J. AIR L. & COM. 685, 697 (2002).
117. Id. at 695.
118. Scott McCartney, Why Travelers Benefit When an Airline Hub Closes, WALL ST. J., Nov.
1, 2005, at D1.
119. Id. Communities tend to view the loss of an airline hub as a "doomsday scenario." Id.
120. Id. US Airways' decision to stop using Pittsburgh International Airport as a hub is case
in point that shows how a lost airline hub can benefit travelers. Id.
121. Id.
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system responding to demand. ' 122 While total airport traffic in Pittsburgh has decreased and employment at the airport has fallen, car rentals
have increased 10%, the airport has added more parking, and the airport
mall's occupancy rate has remained at 100%.123 In response to discount

carriers entering new markets, Delta Air Lines cut business-travel fares at
its Cincinnati hub, American Airlines cut fares in Miami, and US Airways
matched Southwest's fares in Philadelphia. 12 4 However, the market does
not always respond this quickly, and often the carrier forced to leave the
airport is a smaller operation. The following table illustrates the mixed
results of hub closings in previous years.
CASE EXAMPLES OF MARKETS' RESPONSE TO
125
AIRLINE WITHDRAWALS

Effect on passenger traffic

Change
in fares

Market

Year

Airline

Nashville, TN

1995

American Airlines
eliminated hub

Other airlines' traffic increased.
Origin and destination traffic
increased.

Greensboro, NC

1995

Continental Lite
eliminated hub

Other airlines's traffic increased.
Origin and destination traffic
decreased.

+5.5%

Colorado
Springs, CO

1997

Western Pacific
moved operations
to Denver

Other airlines' traffic decreased.
Origin and destination traffic
decreased.

+43.6%

St. Louis, MO

2001

TWA acquired by
American Airlines

Other airlines' traffic decreased.
Little change in origin and
destination traffic.

+5.4%

Kansas City, MO

2002

Vanguard Airlines
suspended service

Little change in other airlines'
traffic. Little change in origin and
destination traffic.

+4.2%

Columbus, OH

2003

America West
eliminated hub

Other airlines' traffic increased.
Little change in origin and
destination traffic.

+3.6%

-10.2%

122. Id. Losing a hub actually tends to benefit travelers as airport gates free up and discounters tend to move in which results in lower fares. See, e.g., id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Structural Costs Continue to Challenge Legacy Airlines' Financial Performance:
Testimony Before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,Subcommittee on
Aviation, U.S. Senate, GAO-05-834T, 12 (July 13, 2005) (statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker,
Director Physical Infrastructure Issues). "Note: Little change in traffic means that traffic
increased or decreased less than 5 percent and that origin and destination traffic increased or
decreased less than 10 percent. Changes in passenger traffic and fares are measured from 4
quarters prior to the airline departure to 8 quarters after." Id.
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C.

SLOTS AND GATES AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY

Airline industry concentration is also a product of the control major
carriers exercise over slots and gates. 126 For instance, at Chicago O'Hare
airport, two airlines control approximately eighty-five percent of the
takeoff and landing slots; 127 and a few carriers dominate the majority of
slots at Reagan National, LaGuardia, and Kennedy. 128 The established
carriers continued to increase their control. 129 The following table indicates this trend from 1990 - 1999.
INCREASE IN SLOT AND GATE CONTROL

130

Percentage Held

Airport/Holding Entity
1991

1996

1999

O'Hare
American and United

83

87

84

Other established airlines

13

9

10

3

2

3

1

1

3

Shawmut Bank, American, and Delta

60

75

84

Other established airlines

18

13

14

Other financial institutions

19

6

1

3

7

1

43

64

70

39

14

14

Financial institutions
Post-deregulation airlines
Kennedy

Post-deregulation airlines
LaGuardia
American, Delta, and USAir
Other established airlines

7

20

10

12

2

6

American, Delta, and USAir

43

59

65

Other established airlines

Financial institutions
Post-deregulation airlines
Reagan National

42

20

18

Financial institutions

7

19

14

Post-deregulation airlines

8

3

3

126. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 5.
127. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 5.
128. Barriers to Entry Continue in Some Domestic Markets: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Consumer and Environ. Affairs, Comm. on Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, GAO/
RCED-98-112 (Mar. 5, 1998) (statement by John H. Anderson, Jr., Ass'n Director Transp. Issues
Resources, Community, & Econ. Dev. Division) [hereinafter Barriers Continue in Markets].
129. See, e.g., Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 5.
130. Achim I. Czemy & Henning Tegner, Secondary Markets for Runway Capacity, in
IMPLEMENTING REFORM ON TRANSPORT PRICING: IDENTIFYING MODE-SPECIFIC ISSUES 5 (Berlin
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Unfortunately, the unavailability of slots has mostly affected the new
airlines.13 1 In 1986, the FAA adopted a regulation permitting slots to be
bought, sold, or leased for consideration; often referred to as the "buy/
133
sell" rule. 132 The fixed number of slots has resulted in a sellers market;
and slots are costly with prices exceeding $2 million for peak period slots
and off peak slots selling for about $500,000.134 Not only do the airlines

consider the slots private assets for sale, but they also use them as collat35
eral in securing loans.'
A new entrant experiences extreme difficulty in buying slots because
established carriers rarely put the slots up for sale. 136 A new entrant re137
quires about six slots to be competitive, with three in the peak periods.
They can lease the slots, but it places them at a disadvantage because the
established carrier obtained most of the slots from the FAA at no cost.
Therefore, new entrants incur costs that the established carriers never
paid.

138

New-entrants are also disadvantaged because slot leases are for only
a short period of time.' 39 The buy/sell rule contains a "use or lose" provision requiring airlines to use their slots at least eighty percent of the time
U. of Technology, Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy 2002), http://www.imprint-eu.org/public/
Papers/IMPRINTCzerny&Tegner.pdf.
131. Id. at 2 & 5.
132. 14 C.F.R. § 93.221(a) 1989; Robert M. Hardaway, Economics of Airport Regulation, 20
TRANSP. L. J. 47, 57-58 (1991). The FAA first implemented the number of takeoffs and landings
at Kennedy, O'Hare, National, and LaGuardia in an attempt to reduce congestion. Deregulation increased the number of airlines wanting to serve these airports which in turn complicated
the FAA's efforts to allocate the slots among the airlines. In order to minimize the role government played in the allocation of the slots, the DOT began to allow airlines to buy and sell them
to one another. The "buy/sell" rule "grandfathered" slots to the airlines that were already holders. Barriers Continue in Markets, supra note 128, at 4.
133. Hardaway, supra note 132, at 63.
134. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 5. The airlines holding the
majority of the slots at the four controlled airports emphasize the large financial investment
made in the financing of development at the airports and in buying additional slots to build upon
their grandfathered positions. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 5.
The airlines however, were forewarned, when the slots were grandfathered, that the DOT still
owned the slots, and reserved rights to withdraw the slots at any time. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 4.
135. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 4. The slots, of course, are
not private assets, but public assets. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at
6.
136. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6. When, or if, the carriers
sell a slot, usually it is to an airline that already possesses a considerable number of slots at the
airport. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
137. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
138. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
139. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6. Historically, ten percent
of slot leases were for less than thirty days, and twelve percent between thirty-one and eightynine days. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
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or forfeit. 140 For the carrier to meet this requirement and thereby protect
their slots, the unused slots can only be leased to other airlines for a short
term.' 4 1 With the possibility of a new-entrant's access to an airport being
142
terminated on short notice, starting a new service cannot be justified.
The Department of Transportation (DOT) recognized the need for
increased competition at slot-controlled airports and allowed additional
slots for entry at O'Hare, LaGuardia, and Kennedy. 143 Frontier, AirTran
Airlines and AirTran Airways obtained slots into LaGuardia, Reno Air
and Trans States Airlines into O'Hare. 1 44 The DOT used its power to
award additional slots by finding "it to be in the public interest and the
circumstances to be exceptional. '145 Even with new slots being allocated,
barriers to entry still exist because an airline cannot serve the airport
without gates and other ground facilities. 146 Development of these facilities is complicated financially.
Concentration at hubs tends to create substantial investment requirements. 147 The investment capital can be raised through general obligation bonds and/or revenue bonds. 148 General obligation bonds have
the full faith and credit of the issuing government whereas revenue bonds
149 Most
are debt that is paid out of revenues generated by the airport.
investment capital is currently raised through revenue bonds and may im150
pact the terms and conditions of an airline's airport use agreement.
An airport use agreement is a contract identifying the rights and privileges between the airport operator and the airline. 1 5 1 The agreement
specifies the financial and operational relationship between the two parties and defines how risk and responsibility of airport operations are to be
1 52
allocated.
The airport practice of entering into long term lease agreements with
140. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
141. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
142. Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 6.
143. Barriers Continue in Markets, supra note 128, at 5. The DOT reserved approximately
five percent of the slots at National, LaGuardia, and O'Hare. In 1986, the DOT distributed the
slots in a random lottery to those airlines having no or few slots at those airports. Barriersto
Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 4.
144. Barriers Continue in Markets, supra note 128, at 5; Barriers to Entry Continue in Key
Markets, supra note 26, at 5.
145. Barriers Continue in Markets, supra note 128, at 5; The FAA Authorization Act of 1994
(P.L. 103-305, sec. 206).
146. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 3; See Robert M. Hardaway, Economics of Airport Regulation, 20 TRANSP. L.J. 47, 53-56 (1991).
147.

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's 9 (1984).

148. Id. at 17.
149. Id.
150. DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 36, at 450.
151. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147 at 18 (1984).
152. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147 at 18 (1984).
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incumbent airlines permits those airlines to monopolize existing airport
resources for long periods of time and to exclude competition. When major carriers do sublet their gates, it is usually to other major carriers with
whom they do not directly compete; or if not to majors then to regional
carriers, usually code-sharing partners. 153 The subleases frequently restrict use of the gates to non-preferred times and at higher costs than paid
by the incumbent. 154 For instance, Southwest leased space at Detroit
from Northwest and paid nineteen times what Northwest paid for the
space. 15 5 Northwest also sublets one gate to Frontier at Minneapolis, telling Frontier when the gate can be used.1 56 Protection for the new entrant
is scarce if the legacy carrier decides to terminate the agreement. Notice
periods for terminating and vacating the space range from forty-eight
hours to thirty days. With little time to find alternative space at the air157
port, airline and passengers are left stranded.
Exclusive use agreements also present the potential for an airline to
hold more gates than necessary for currently scheduled operations. 158
The nature of these agreements prevents the airport operator from offer159
ing underused or unused gates to another airline.
To address this problem, some airports incorporate preferential use
clauses allowing the lessee the first right to use the facilities. But if no
operations are scheduled, the airport may allow another airline to use the
facilities during the unscheduled time. 160 This arrangement still allows
the lessee to seize the space if they later decide to schedule operations
during those times. 16' Another solution is recapture provisions, allowing
the operator to require the incumbent to forfeit or share gates not being
used, 162; however only seven percent of concentrated airports have such
provisions.

163

In 1996, the majority of gates at six airports were exclusively leased
153.

UNITED

STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AIRLINE COMPETITION: INDUSTRY

OPERATING AND MARKETING PRACTICES LIMIT MARKET ENTRY, 42 (1990) [hereinafter Operat-

ing and Marketing Practices].
154. Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 9.
155. Hardaway, supra note 132, at 54
156. Low Fare CarriersDemand Access to Major Airports, WORLD AIRLINE NEWS, Jul. 24,
1998.
157. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 42.
158. Id. at 33. For instance, Northwest has the most control over gates with the lowest usage
of those gates out of the 10 largest airlines. An average carrier at a hub airport realizes 6.5 daily
departures per gate, but Northwest gets 5.1 daily departures. Sharon Schmickle & Tony Kennedy, Dominant Airlines Challenged, STAR TRIB., Mar. 6, 1998, at 1D.
159. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 43.
160. Id. at 32.
161. Id. at 32
162. Id. at 32
163. Id. at 35.
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to one airline. 164 A 1990 survey of the sixty-six largest airports indicated
that eighty-five percent of their gates were dominated by the incumbent
165
carriers through long-term, exclusive use leases.
166
At some airports, all gates were governed by exclusive use leases.
For example, Northwest controls the majority of gates at Minneapolis and
Detroit under long-term, exclusive use agreements; and exclusive use
leases at Cincinnati, Charlotte and Pittsburgh have also tied up the vast
majority of gates, giving control to one airline. 167 The larger the share of
gates leased under the agreements, the higher the fares. 168 The following
lists the airports where post-deregulation airlines reported difficulty gaining competitive access to gates.
EXCLUSIVE GATE LEASES'

69

Total
Number
of Gates

Gates Under
Exclusive
Leases

Charlotte

48

43

34 gates leased to USAir until 2007

Cincinnati

67

67

50 gates leased to Delta with 9 leases expiring in
2015 and 41 expiring in 2023

Detroit

86

76

64 gates leased to Northwest until the end of 2008,
with all but 10 under exclusive use terms

Minneapolis

65

65

49 gates leased to Northwest with 16 leases
already expired and now on month to month basis,
and remainder expiring at various times ranging
from the end of 1997 to 2015.

Newark

94

79

43 gates leased to Continental until 2013, 36 gates
leased to the other established airlines until 2018
and 15 gates reserved primarily for international

Pittsburgh

75

66

Airport

Major Lease Holder and Date of Lease Expiration

use.

50 gates leased to USAir until 2018.

Management boards at some airlines consider the airport practice of
entering into long term lease agreements with incumbent carriers to constitute a formidable and continuing barrier to entry. 170 However, while
airports generally want to attract new airlines, they face constraints such
as availability of gates, ticket counters, passenger hold rooms, and bagt 71
gage claim areas.
Agreements often provide airlines with significant power over air164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26,
Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26,
Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26,
Barriers Continue in Markets, supra note 128, at 6.
Operatingand Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 18.
Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26,
Barriers to Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26,
Operatingand Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 32.

at 9.
at 9.
at 9.

at 10.
at 9.
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port ventures and pricing policy. 1 72 These agreements, known as majoror
ity-in-interest clauses, give the incumbent airline the right to approve 173
disapprove any major proposed airport capital development projects.
Because the airlines that carry the financial risk of operating the airport
could be affected by airport construction through higher lease payments,
174
the airline may require the airport to include such a clause.
Thus airport operators rarely proceed with major projects without
conferring with the airlines operating at the airports. 175 This is mostly
due to wary investors who might hesitate in a bond issue for a project
176
lacking approval of the airlines.
Long-term agreements negatively affect competition if used to pre177
vent expansion of facilities for new-entrant airlines.

The GAO found that airlines and airports have different perceptions
of the timing of projects. 178 Airports try to plan ahead and want facilities
available on schedule with growth projections. Airlines, however, tend to
focus only on funding projects that address current needs. 179 The GAO
found that the airlines' position may restrict capacity at these airports,
possibly discouraging entry.1 80 Airline officials claim signatory airline actions under majority-in-interest agreements have never directly precluded
new entrants from initiating service.18 1 Nevertheless, at the airports surveyed by the GAO, about seventy-five percent with a majority-in-interest
agreement stated that such agreements limited or delayed expansion to
some degree, and thirty-six large and medium-sized airports reported
projects as greatly limited or delayed. 182 Therefore, the resulting delays

may discourage competitive entry.

83

172. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147, at 24.
173. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147, at 25.

These clauses give

airlines with the majority of traffic, the ability to approve or veto capital projects that involve
significant increases in the rates and fees airlines pay for the use of airport facilities.
174. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147, at 25.
175. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147, at 25.
176. FINANCING U.S. AIRPORTS IN THE 1980's, supra note 147, at 25. The financial commu-

nity considers the backing of a tenant airline necessary for an airport planning a major improvement or expansion project. The long-term commitments from tenant airlines enable the airport
to get a lower interest rate on the debt issues. When backing airport debt, the airlines want to
insure that the airport does not unilaterally issue more debt causing higher lease payments, landing fees or other charges. Therefore, the majority in interest agreement run for the life of the
bond issue, twenty or thirty years. Operatingand Marketing Practices, supra note 153, at 47-48.
177. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 48.
178. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 49.
179. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 49.
180. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 49.
181. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 49.
182. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 48
183. Operating and Marketing Practices,supra note 153, at 49.
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D.

MERGERS, ALLIANCES AND BANKRUPTCIES

Mergers, alliances and bankruptcies contribute to airline industry
concentration by reducing competition. As increased competition following deregulation began to pressure the legacy airlines, the Reagan administration wanted to avoid the political fall-out that would result if
unionized airlines went out of business. 184 Thus, a philosophy borrowed
from the FDIC's experience with savings and loans was adopted: allow
failing and inefficient airlines to merge.1 85 Using this short-term fix, jobs
were saved and political fall-out was reduced. However, the resulting
mergers have contributed to today's highly concentrated industry in
which a handful of inefficient, under-capitalized airlines control the industry and monopolize or duopolize most American airports. 186 Recent
mergers include US Airways and America West, Air France and KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM), and United Airlines with Mesa Air.
United formed this last alliance solely to reduce competition by one of its
former low-cost partners, Atlantic Coast Airlines (ACA). 187 ACA was
based at Washington Dulles International Airport and operated under
the United logo and codes. 188 Another United Airlines partner, Mesa
Air, made a bid to purchase ACA. 189 United solved this problem by
merging with Mesa Air.1 90
The 2003 merger between Air France and KLM was limited by a
European Commission because the Commission identified 14 routes
where the merger would "eliminate or significantly reduce competition." 19 1 Even still, the merged company became the largest airline in
Europe, and one of the largest in the world.' 92 US Airways and America
West merged in September of 2005 creating the United States' "largest
full-service, low-cost, low-fare airline.' 93 In 1990, America West was the
first start-up airline since industry deregulation to reach major-airline
184. See generally Airport Access Report, supra note 113.
185. See generally Airport Access Report, supra note 113.
186. Dr. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Director, Institute of Air & Space Law at McGill University, Address before the University of Leuven Conference at Eurocontrol Headquarters Brussels, Belgium (May 19, 2005).
187.

Aviation, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. PUB. UTIL., COMM., & TRANSP. L. ANN. REP. 59, 71.

188. Id. at 70.
189. Id. at 71.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 65. This included three US to Europe markets: New York, Amsterdam - Atlanta,
and Paris - Detroit. The commission required the merged company to surrender enough airport
slots at Amsterdam and Paris to "allow competitors to operate up to thirty-one new roundtrip
flights per day in the affected markets."
192. Id. The largest shareholder of the merged entity (44 percent) was the French
government.
193. Press Release, US Airways, Reorganized US Airways Group, Inc. Completes Merger
with America West Airlines (Sept. 27, 2005).
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status.' 94
In addition to these and other mergers, there are currently three major global airline alliances that further reduce competition in the industry
and consist of multiple carriers: Oneworld, SkyTeam, and Star Alliance.
Oneworld was founded in 1998195 and SkyTeam was initiated by Air
France and Delta Airlines in 1999.196 Star Alliance evolved from an
agreement in 1992 between Air Canada and United Airlines. 197 These
alliances are comprised of global carriers and offer benefits to members
and customers by sharing ticket offices, check-in facilities, frequent flyer
miles and lounges; information consolidation; smoother transfers between member carriers on connecting flights; and higher customer service
satisfaction.'

98

Entry into the industry by new competitors is already difficult, based
on present barriers that exist at major airports. 199 The alliances can
sometimes intensify concentration; 20 0 at airports such as LaGuardia and
Reagan National where concentration is most acute due to slot and gate
constraints, the barriers-to-entry are only strengthened by the alliances
because they cause market share per competitor to increase
20 1
substantially.
The potential for losing meaningful competition is greatest on routes
where the merged or allied carriers both serve. There may be less incentive for the carriers to compete, causing airfares to rise. The alliances
remove the threat that high fares or poor service will attract competition 194. US Airways, America West Complete Merger, Consumer Affairs, Sept. 27, 2005, available at http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/usairamericawest6.html.
195. Oneworld.com, Oneworld Fact Sheets, http://www.oneworld.com/ow/news-and-information/fact-sheets/details?objectID=21&tempURLParam (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
196. SkyTeam.com, About SkyTeam: History, http://www.skyteam.com/EN/aboutSkyteam/
history.jsp#2000 (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
197. StarAlliance.com, Media Room: History, http://www.staralliance.com/staralliance/star/
frame/main_10.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2006).
198. Oneworld.com, supra note 195; SkyTeam.com, supra note 196; StarAlliance.com, supra
note 197.
199. Proposed Domestic Airline Alliances Raise Serious Issues: Testimony Before the Subcomm. On Aviation, Comm. On Commerce, Sci., and Transp., U.S. Senate 2 (June 4, 1998)
(statement of John H. Anderson, Jr., Dir., Transp. Issues, Res., Cmty., and Econ. Dev. Div. of
GAO) [hereinafter Proposed Alliances]. There are two types of alliances: end-to-end, and horizontal overlapping. End-to-end is pro-competitive in that it provides the participating airlines
access to city-pairs and routes not otherwise accessible. The network is extended to provide
travelers with more travel options. The horizontal overlapping alliance, however, is anti-consumer because competition is reduced through combined market shares, regional domination
and control of important gateways. Aviation Alliances: Testimony Before the Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., U.S. Senate 3-4 (June 4, 1998) (statement of Hershel I. Kamen, Staff
Vice President of Int'l and Regulatory Affairs for Continental Airlines, Inc.).
200. Proposed Alliances, supra note 199, at 11.
201. Proposed Alliances, supra note 199, at 2.
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and to the extent concentration increases, entry will become more difficult. Alliances can arguably create considerable uncertainty regarding
20 2
the ability of new entrants to compete in many markets.
Bankruptcy can further affect competition within the airline industry. Professor Dempsey has observed that no one has ever made long
term profits transporting people from one place to another. 20 3 However,
the U.S. Government has traditionally been reluctant to allow airlines to
fail.20 4 The result is that while bankruptcies are common, airlines rarely
become defunct.
Most U.S. Airlines file for bankruptcy with chapter 11 status, as opposed to chapter 7 status. 20 5 Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code allows
for reorganization of a company in hopes of becoming profitable again,
while chapter 7 calls for liquidation of the company. 20 6 There have been
162 bankruptcy filings in the airline industry since 1978 and 148 of these
20 7
were under the protection of Chapter 11 status.
Currently, Delta and Northwest have Chapter 11 status. 20 8 American has threatened to file bankruptcy, 20 9 United recently emerged from
bankruptcy 210 and US Airways has done the same through a merger. 2 11
Prior to the US Airways/America West merger, almost half of the capacity of the airline industry was flying in bankruptcy. The financial hardships within the airline sector have been caused by a number of factors
including economic slowing, price pressure, rising fuel costs, less business
travel, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and the SARS epidemic. Operational
cuts have been made by most legacy carriers, but bankruptcy is sometimes necessary in order to institute reforms. Many carriers reduce or
eliminate labor costs - such as pension benefits - in order to reduce ex202. Proposed Alliances, supra note 199, at 15
203. Dr. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Director, Institute of Air & Space Law at McGill University, Address before the University of Leuven Conference at Eurocontrol Headquarters Brussels, Belgium (May 19, 2005).
204. Id. Instead, the government allows bankruptcy proceedings that give the company's
additional chances to become profitable again - supposedly for the public good.
205. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, Commercial Aviation: Bankruptcy and Pension
Problems are Symptoms of Underlying Structural Issues, GA-05-945, at 19 (2005) [hereinafter
Pension Problems].
206. Id. at 9, 10, 19.
207. Id. at 2, 19. Under chapter 11 status, management still continues to run the day to day
business of the airline, but "all significant decisions must be approved by the bankruptcy court."
The idea is that the company can reorganize itself and eventually become profitable again.
208. Press Release, Delta Airlines, Delta Air Lines Files for Chapter 11 Reorganization to
Address Fin. Challenges (Sept. 14, 2005); Press Release, Northwest Airlines, Northwest Airlines
Restructuring (Sept. 14, 2005).
209. Aviation, supra note 187, at 59.
210. Press Release, UAL, United Exits Bankruptcy as a Strong Competitor Committed To
Continuous Improvement (Feb. 1, 2006).
211. Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 17.
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penses and liability while under Chapter 11 bankruptcy status. 2 12
Some commentators believe that the industry's problems stem from
over-capacity, and that bankruptcies will assist in solving these problems.
However, history shows that airline industry growth has "continued unaffected by major liquidations. ' 21 3 Low-cost carriers benefit most from
2 14
major airline bankruptcies as they rush in to fill the lost capacity space.
This has forced legacy carriers to turn to international flights for higher
profits because they cannot compete with the smaller carriers on domestic ticket prices. 21 5 To compensate for these new economic realities, the
larger carriers have begun shifting aircraft from domestic to international
flights, aggressively vying for service to new foreign locations. For examby 15-20 percent and inple, Delta plans to reduce domestic capacity
2 16
crease international flights by 25 percent.

IV. Is DOMESTIC CABOTAGE THE ANSWER?
A.

THE CURRENT STATE OF CABOTAGE

Airline cabotage is "the carriage of air traffic that originates and terminates within the boundaries of a given country by an air carrier of another country. '2 17 The current U.S. cabotage rules stem from the 1920s
Jones Act, 21 8 which requires that goods shipped between U.S. ports must
travel on vessels owned and staffed by Americans. 21 9 The Jones Act restrictions were expanded to include all forms of transportation, including
aircraft. 220 Generally, cabotage rights are only granted if the country requesting cabotage rights grants a similar privilege to U.S. carriers, and if
212. Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 1, 17, 37, 53.
213. SUBCOMM. ON AVIATION, Hearing on Current Situation and Future Outlook of U.S.
Commercial Airline Industry, Sept. 28, 2005, at 2, http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/
09-28-05/09-28-05memo.html.
214. Mary Schlangenstein, Low-cost carrierspoised to reap benefits from Delta bankruptcy,
DESERETNEWS.COM, Sept. 19, 2005, at 1, available at http://deseretnews.com/dn/view/0,1249,6101
52136,00.html.
215. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Northwest, Delta Look Overseas for Profits, MSNBC.coM, Oct. 7,
2005, at 2, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9622222/ (The turn to international flights could be
called a "bright spot" for legacy carriers, as they tend to be profitable alternatives to domestic
market share).
216. Id. (President Bush has assisted legacy carriers by agreements that the Departments of
State and Transportation have reached with other countries to open up international routes to
US companies).
217. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, Airline Cabotage, U.S.

DEP'T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/ost/ogc/subject/faqs/international/airlineCabotage.html.
218. 46 U.S.C.S. § 883 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2006)(commonly referred to as the
Jones Act).
219. Id.
220. See Eric V. Hull, Through the Looking Glass: Judicial Interpretation of Vessel Status
Leaves Injured Workers Adrift in Unchanged Territory, 16 U.S.F. Mar. L.J. 321, 341 (2003-2004).
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the CAB determines that the grant is within the public interest and con22 1
sistent with international agreements.
In the United States, foreign air carriers must receive a cabotage permit from the CAB, but the Board may grant an exemption from this requirement when it finds that the exemption would be in the public
2 23
interest. 222 Courts have held that exemptions are to be used sparingly.
Thus, so-called domestic cabotage, allowing international carriers to
"take on for compensation, at a place in the United States, passengers or
cargo destined for another place in the United States," is usually entirely
denied or severely restricted. 224 The Department of Transportation Office of the General Counsel described the difficult granting of an exemption for international cabotage as follows:
we must find that the authority is required in the public interest; that because of an emergency created by unusual circumstances not arising in the
normal course of business the traffic cannot be accommodated by U.S. carriers holding certificates ... that all possible efforts have been made to place
the traffic on U.S. carriers; and that the transportation is necessary to avoid
22 5
undue hardship to the traffic involved

While the current laws are hostile to the concept of domestic cabo-

tage, there have been liberalization efforts with regard to international
cabotage, particularly the so-called "Open Skies" agreements. The basic
concept of these agreements is to allow carriers to fly from one foreign
country to another foreign country without returning to their country of
origin in between. 226 For example, under an agreement, a U.S. registered
aircraft could fly directly from Paris to Belgium without returning to New
York first. While these agreements do not allow true domestic cabotage-which would allow internal domestic flights by international carriers-they may be a step in the right direction.
Open Skies operates on reciprocal agreements between participating
countries that negotiate the relationship bilaterally. 2 27 Currently the
221. See 49 U.S.C.S. § 41703 (a)-(b) (West 2006); U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 217.
222. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 402, 416(b), amended by 49 U.S.C.A. § 1372 (current
version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 41301-41302 (1994), 1386(b) (current version at 49 U.S.C.A. 40109
(1994)); Air N.Z. Limited v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 726 F.2d 832, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
223. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 416(b), 1006, amended by 49 U.S.C.A. § 1372 (current
version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 41301-41302 (1994)), 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1386(b), 1486 (current version at
49 U.S.C.A. § 40109 (1994)); Island Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 363 F.2d 120, 125 (9th
Cir. 1966).
224. 49 U.S.C.A. § 41703(c) (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2006).
225. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., supra note 217.
226. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, Open Skies
Agreements, Aug. 29, 2006, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tra/c661.htm; THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE ONLINE, EU Urged to Accept PartialAir Pact, AIR CARGO WORLD, 2003, http://www.air

cargoworld.com/breaknews/04122004a.htm.
227. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Current Model Open Skies Agreement Text, BUREAU OF ECO-
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United States has Open Skies agreements with more than 70 countries,
including many individual members of the European Union. 228 However, opponents in the EU have stalled efforts to negotiate a multilateral
agreement encompassing the entire EU by arguing that EU carriers
should be allowed to fly from state to state in the U.S. if U.S. carriers are
allowed to fly from country to country in the EU.2 29 In other words, the
critics want domestic cabotage rights in the United States. These EU proponents also want to abolish ownership limits, which currently restrict
foreign ownership of U.S. airlines to 25%.230
In 2002, the European Court struck down the draft Open Skies
agreement, saying it violated the laws of the 15-nation EU common market.231 The court, however, urged the sides to continue negotiations and,
in 2005, the EU and U.S. began a fifth round of aviation talks to attempt
to resolve their differences. 232 While the U.S. has offered to raise the
foreign ownership limit to 49%, it has ruled out allowing domestic cabotage because the negotiators feel Congress would not permit it.233 One
basis of concern by Congress is that any agreement on airline cabotage
would set undesirable precedent for the maritime sector, a nonnegotiable
issue for the United States.23 4 Conversely, many countries in the EU
worry that if the U.S. had unrestricted access to the European market,
2 35
national carriers would quickly go out of business.
Still, there is significant pressure from both sides to get an initial
agreement in place, while leaving the door open for negotiation of the
more contentious issues. One proposal on the table is for the U.S. to
allow European carriers to operate subsidiaries and partnerships in the
U.S. until a full cabotage agreement can be worked out. Several of the
agreements involve only the transportation of cargo between points in
the partnering country. 23 6 It remains to be seen whether Open Skies is
the beginning of a wave of liberalization or merely a blip on the radar
screen.
Outside of Europe, some international agreements are limited to
NOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, Apr. 13, 2004, at Article 3, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/

rIs/othr/19514.htm.
228. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Open Skies Partners, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS
AFFAIRS,

Oct. 19, 2006, at 2, available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/2006/22281.htm.

229. See THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE ONLINE, EU Urged to Accept PartialAir Pact, AIR

2003, http://www.aircargoworld.com/breaknews/04122004a.htm.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 2.
235. THE BRATTLE GROUP, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AN EU-US OPEN AVIATION
8-6 (Dec. 2002).
CARGO WORLD,

236. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 228.
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certain carriers. For example, Northwest and United are the "only American carriers with the right to pick up passengers in Japan for flights further into Asia. ' 237 This valuable agreement, which dates back to 1952, is
a significant reason why Northwest is the largest carrier between the U.S.
238
and Japan.
Despite advances in some areas, the U.S. government insists on
fighting what many consider a losing battle to prop up the legacy carriers.
In 2004 alone, Congress allocated $15 billion in loans and grants to the
domestic airline industry in an effort to get the industry back on its feet in
the wake of the September 11th attacks. 239 Indeed, in many cases,
"rather than relax foreign airline restrictions, the government is rigorously enforcing them." For example, in 2004, the U.S. fined Asiana Airlines, "the South Korean carrier, a record $750,000 for unauthorized
service between Guam and Saipan, part of a U.S. commonwealth. '240 In
another famous incident, Virgin Atlantic Airways was forced to cancel
plans to launch Virgin America, a U.S. based airline using U.S. aircraft
and U.S. workers that would channel passengers to JFK where they could
board Virgin Atlantic jets to London. 24 1 The project was scuttled be242
cause of U.S. cabotage laws, despite raising $200 million in financing.
B.

CABOTAGE AND THE LABOR PROBLEM

One barrier to domestic cabotage agreements is negotiations with
labor. United States airline pilots, as a representative group, have consistently opposed cabotage. U.S. pilots' main concern regarding liberalization is being played against their European counterparts to seek a
competitive advantage. 24 3 During the 1970's TWA and Pan Am exhibited a similar resistance to deregulation; the industry players knew that
244
some carriers would not survive the changes.
237. Northwest, Delta Look Overseas for Profits, supra note 215, at 2.
238. Id.
239. Christopher Elliott, Let ForeignAirlines Fly Inside USA, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 2002, at
13A.
240. Id.
241. See Edward Hasbrouck, Airline Subsidies, Alliances, and Code-sharing,THE PRACTICAL
NOMAD,

Jan. 30, 2006, available at http://www.hasbrouck.org/articles/alliances.html.

242.

See generally George Raine, Taking to the Air Low-fare Startup Virgin America Says it
Has the Funding to Fly, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Dec. 9, 2005, at 2, available at http://www

.sfgate.com/cgi-binlarticle.cgi?f=/C/a/2005/12/09/BUGA2G58LF1.DTL&hw=virgin&sn=003&sc=
934.
243. Chris Dodd, Rewriting the 'Rules of Engagement', AIR LINE PILOT, May 2000, at 10
(airlines are expanding the competitive arena beyond the national boundaries that were used to
rationalize current and future Collective Bargaining Agreements, to include carriers in the European Union).
244. Michael Whitaker, Vice President, Int'l and Regulatory Affairs, United Airlines, Open
Aviation for a Global Industry: Removing the Last Barriers to Airline Competition (Aug. 14,
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Until 2004, pilots at major U.S. airlines had been at the top of the
compensation pyramid and resisted cabotage because they believed they
have the most to lose.24 5 While globalization may not have detrimental
effects on an airline as a corporate entity, U.S. union pilots have taken
the position that there is a significant impact on the pilots who gain or
lose that flying. 24 6 While airline managements and Air Transport Officials believe the industry's problems can be solved by lowering labor
costs, prospective pilots feel that they have already made sacrifices to
meet the hiring standards at the major airlines. 247 For that reason, it is
important that the labor forces in both the United States and the European Union have representatives involved in the globalization talks and
have their concerns addressed. This conclusion is affirmed by Mr. Hunnicutt, who recognizes that a significant amount of confidence building
will be necessary to demonstrate to the affected parties that substantial
24 8
commercial benefits will result.
Successful confidence building or handholding measures will not be
easy to achieve with airline labor groups. Pilots often see their relationship with management as being similar to the arrangement between cartoon characters Lucy (management) and Charlie Brown (labor). Lucy
has promised to hold a football while Charlie Brown kicks it downfield,
and both characters know that on past occasions Lucy has pulled the ball
away at the last second, with Charlie Brown falling flat on his back. Nevertheless Lucy promises that this time will be different, and even though
Charlie Brown has some reservations, Charlie Brown runs towards the
ball with the same results as before.
In looking at industry developments in the 1990's, pilots have felt
like Charlie Brown. At the inception of global alliances and U.S./EU
liberalization, free trade advocates extolled the benefits that would mate2003), in COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., at 6-7, available at http://www.cei.org/gencon/023,03641
.cfm.
245. See ALPA's GLOBAL AVIATION STRATEGY GROUP, The Global Airline Market Heats
Up, AIR LINE PILOT, Oct. 2000, at 4, available at http://cf.alpa.org/internet/alp/2000/oct00pl8
.htm.
246. See Duane E. Woerth, Airline Labor Law in the Era of Globalization: The Need to
Correct a Misreadingof the Railway Labor Act, IssuEs IN AVIATION L. AND POL'Y, 16,013 (Oct.
2001).
247. See Oliver Sutton, Europe's Airlines: Brave new world, or what?, 672 EUR. AIR
TRANSP. 26, 27 (2003) (Sutton describes the odyssey most prospective airline pilots go through,
either paying for their own flight training, or spending eight or more years in the military after
graduating from college in order to qualify for an interview. Once hired, pilots earnings potential and work schedule are driven by his or her seniority with that particular company. To quit
and be hired at another airline means starting at the bottom of the heap again for both pay and
work schedules).
248. Charles A. Hunnicutt, US and EU: New Era, New Agreement? Opportunity to Build a
Global System, 18 AIR & SPACE LAW. 1, 14-15 (2003).
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rialize for U.S. carriers because U.S. airline labor costs were cheaper than
their European counterparts. 249 This perceived competitive advantage
would allow U.S. carriers to gain market share in Europe. At the time,
the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) disagreed. ALPA believed that
airline managers would pursue the easy money and code-share with European airlines in lieu of actually investing the time and effort to expand
the U.S. network. 2 50 The results can be seen in the following chart covering growth from 1993 through 1998.251
AIRLINE CODE-SHARE GROWTH BETWEEN

1993

AND 1998252

In addition to missed opportunities for economic growth, the 1990's
contained alarming instances of airlines attempting to circumvent labor
laws by shifting domiciles and/or operating bases to new jurisdictions. In
1995 Federal Express established a pilot domicile in Subic Bay in the
Philippines. 253 A similar event took place involving Atlas Air with the
opening of a domicile in the United Kingdom. 254 FedEx and Atlas
claimed that the Railway Labor Act 25 5 (RLA) did not apply to the pilots
who were based in a foreign domicile, and therefore the wages and work249. Captain Duane Woerth, Liberalization of the InternationalAir-TransportationIndustry:
How Will US Pilots Fare?, ALPA.ORG, available at http://cf.alpa.org/internet/prescorner/code
share/index.htm.
250. Id.
251. Woerth, supra note 249, at figure 2.
252. Captain Duane Woerth, ALPA's President, Opening statement - Duane Woerth to
Transportation Research Board: Looking at Alliances (Jan. 11, 1999), in ALPA.ORo, Jan. 1999,
at 3, available at http://cf.alpa.org/internet/speech/sp011199.htm (contrast Chart A above with
what, from a labor perspective, may have been the most palatable international alliance - the
agreement between Northwest and KLM. This agreement assures that all block hour growth is
split evenly between the two carriers. Furthermore, quantifiable floors are given for
international code-share levels between hubs as well as non-hub cities).
253. Woerth, supra note 249.
254. Woerth, supra note 249.
255. Woerth, supra note 249.
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ing conditions for those pilots would be negotiated separately from the
agreement applicable to pilots based in the United States.2 5 6
It is not just carriers in the United States that are pushing the envelope on labor law and regulations. The emerging low-cost carriers in Europe are on the cutting edge of turning airline employees into migrating
commodities. 25 7 RyanAir has used the provisions of the European Union
to hire pilots from the former Yugoslavia, provide them with Irish piloting licenses and work permits, and then base these pilots in the United
Kingdom. 258 This shell game leaves the employee with virtually no
means of protest for any disputes with the airline. 259
Setting aside the lack of trust pilots place in airline management, another group that airline employees would like to keep at arm's length are
the negotiators of U.S. trade agreements. European and American trade
regulators approach issues from different philosophies. The Europeans
place the welfare of local businesses (and therefore employees) high on
the priority list while U.S. negotiators give their attention to the interests
of the consumer. 260 Hence, American workers may feel left out in the
cold when the federal government does not place the welfare of U.S. corporations and workers on the same level as the European regulators. 261
It is not only U.S. airline employees who have reason to view cabotage cautiously. European airline employees and management have
cause for concern if a bona fide cabotage program were to be enacted.
At present, cabotage would allow a foreign carrier to pick up passengers
in one U.S. city and deposit those passengers in another US city while
operating under that foreign carrier's native laws and regulations pertaining to safety and security, labor and the environment.2 62 In order to access the U.S. market share, European airlines would receive a right of
establishment so the carrier would have the right to own and operate a
subsidiary that complies with U.S. federal and state laws such as immigration, labor, and tax law. 263 In essence the EU operation flying within the
U.S. would become a U.S. carrier. Therefore, the EU operation within
256. Woerth, supra note 249 (ALPA brought suit against FedEx in 1995. However the suit
was withdrawn after FedEx pilots elected an in-house union assumed bargaining responsibilities.
Eventually as part of a bargaining agreement, the Subic Bay pilots were brought under the CBA.
The Atlas dispute was also settled through the collective bargaining process in 2002).
257. Dodd, supra, note 243.
258. Id.
259. Id..
260. Bob Davis & Anita Raghavan, Competing Views: GE-Honeywell Deal Gets Caught Up
in Diverging Histories, WALL ST. J., Jul. 3, 2001, at Al.
261. Id.
262. Press Briefing On U.S. Aims for Comprehensive Accord in Air Services Talks with EU
by John Byerly, Chief Negotiator for Transportation, U.S. State Department (Sept. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.useu.be/Categories/Transportation/Sept2903ByerlyOpenSkies.html.
263. Id.
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the U.S. would incur all of the burdens that come with the benefits of the
U.S. marketplace.
United Airlines' Michael Whitaker agrees that as cabotage discussions move from theory towards reality, European enthusiasm will
wane. 264 Yet Whitaker cites a more significant problem within the EU

that must be solved before cabotage or further liberalization can occur:
overcapacity. 265 Presently, there are 252 airlines operating in Europe and
the former Soviet Union. 266 Until the EU takes steps to reduce the number of participating airlines, nationality-driven bilateral agreements will
2 67
remain.
Just as EU carriers would be required to comply with U.S. laws while
serving the domestic market, American carriers would encounter the
same problem operating within nations of the EU. Although the EU removed national borders with respect to rights of establishment, cabotage
and labor migration, each nation retained sovereign tax, labor and social
welfare laws.
C.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CABOTAGE

While the obstacles to making domestic cabotage a reality are formidable, there are significant advantages for U.S. carriers. To begin with,
the current malaise that U.S. carriers find themselves in has led them to
make significant cutbacks, which affect workers, routes, services-and
maybe even safety.2 68 In contrast, many foreign carriers, such as Luf-

thansa, operate profitably and offer renowned service. 2 69 Lufthansa's
profits were up 172% in 2004 and "[wihile its U.S. competitors cut back

on amenities, meals and flight schedules, Lufthansa . . .added an ac-

claimed all-business-class service between Newark, N.J., and Dtisseldorf,
Germany. '2 70 Many commentators believe that increased competition
from foreign carriers would cause U.S. airlines to improve their opera27 1
tions in order to survive.
The question is not whether the U.S. carriers would be able to compete in an open market, but whether foreign carriers would be able to
compete in the U.S. and simultaneously exchange the rights to their skies.
264. Whitaker, supra note 244, at 7.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 8 (as an example, Latvia with a population smaller than metropolitan Washington
D.C. has two international airlines. Additional consolidation is needed among the carriers serving the U.S. There are 6 American carriers providing service to Europe, and there are 25 European carriers flying into the U.S).
267. Id. at 9.
268. Elliott, supra note 239, at 13A.
269. Elliott, supra note 239, at 13A.
270. Elliott, supra note 239, at 13A.
271. Elliott, supra note 239, at 13A.
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The sad truth is that the best competitors in an open market might be the
airlines that have entered the U.S. market since deregulation, not the legacy carriers. Brutal competition over the last 25 years has honed U.S.
airlines to be more efficient and resourceful. New-entry carriers such as
JetBlue, Midwest Express, and Southwest have made service and efficiency the hallmark of their success, and have scrappily competed in the
face of many inherent disadvantages to entry discussed above. They are
ideally suited to compete with large, efficient and service-oriented European carriers.
Major carriers are increasingly ceding the domestic battleground to
the new-entrants while entrenching themselves in international flights.
As one Morgan Stanley airline analyst put it, "[i]nternational has been
'272
the place for (legacy) U.S. carriers to hide from low-cost competition.
New-entry carriers such as JetBlue do not compete with the major carriers on most international flights.2 7 3 Due to the "long planning horizons"
and "years of diplomacy" it takes to operate internationally, particularly
in Asia, "[1]ow-cost carriers are reluctant to jump into the international
arena. '2 74 Another obstacle is that these flights require larger aircraft
27 5
than most discounters fly.
Meanwhile, the major carriers operate flights such as Amsterdam-toBombay at nearly full capacity, allowing them to keep ticket prices high.
The success of these flights is why airlines such as Northwest and Delta
are making international flying a big part of their bankruptcy makeovers
and why United Airlines is increasing its international flights while
emerging from bankruptcy to represent half of its revenues. Both Northwest and Delta are increasing their international flights, while cutting do276
mestic flying and both have also added new international routes.
Northwest's Chief Financial Officer went so far as to say that his airline's
future viability depends on foreign operations. 277 However, increased
competition could force the major carriers to abandon domestic flying
altogether and focus on the inherent advantages their size gives them in
the international field.
Of course, one huge obstacle to the profitability of international
routes is fuel costs. While major carriers are adding new international
routes, they are cutting others, blaming fuel prices. 2 78 Because profits are
never guaranteed, the major carriers may not survive even if they do
272.
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276.
277.
278.
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retool their operations to focus exclusively on international flights. And
just because discount carriers aren't flying from the U.S. to overseas destinations yet, they might someday. The Caribbean and Mexico are seen
as likely destinations for discounters in coming years; JetBlue Airways is
already flying to Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic from New
York.
V.

27 9

ECONOMICS, BANKRUPTCIES, AND

U.S.

AIRLINES' POTENTIAL

FOR SUCCESS

A.

THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE

Underlying arguments for international cabotage is the economic
principle of comparative advantage. This principle holds that all international trade provides mutual benefit to all countries that partake in it and
that "a country can benefit from trade even if it is absolutely more efficient (or absolutely less efficient) than other countries in the production
of every good."'280 The key is that countries should specialize in produc-

2 81
tion and export of goods that they can produce at a relatively low cost.

"Conversely, each country will benefit if it imports those goods which it
'282
produces at a relatively high cost."
The English economist David Ricardo first described the principle of
comparative advantage in 1817.283 Ricardo was interested in the trade
relationship between the United States and Europe. 284 Economist Paul
A. Samuelson provides the following example: suppose that in the U.S. it
takes 1 hour of labor to produce a unit of food, while a unit of clothing
requires 2 hours of labor.285 In Europe, the cost is 3 hours of labor for
286
food and 4 hours of labor for clothing.

279.
280.
6th ed.
281.
282.
283.

Northwest, Delta Look Overseas for Profits, supra note 215, at 2.
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 688 (Irwin McGraw Hill,
1998) (1948).
Id. at 689.
Id.
Id.

284. See id.

285. Id. at 690.
286. See id.
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EXAMPLE: AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN LABOR NEEDS
FOR PRODUCTION

Product
1 unit of food
1 unit of clothing

Necessary Labor for Production
In the U.S.
1
2

In Europe
3
4

Clearly, the U.S. in this situation enjoys an "absolute advantage" in
both goods, for it can produce both at a lower cost than Europe. However, food is relatively less expensive in the U.S. while clothing is relatively less expensive in Europe. This is true because the cost of food in
the U.S. is half that of a unit clothing, while the cost of food in Europe is
3/4 that of a unit of clothing. Thus, the relative cost of food is lower in the
U.S. than in Europe. The real wage of a worker in the U.S. is 1 hour of
work per 1 unit of food or 1/ unit of clothing. The European worker
earns only 1/3 unit of food or 1/4 unit of clothing per hour of work. In the
absence of international trade, the prices of food and clothing in the two
areas will be different because of the difference in production costs.
If trade is allowed between the two regions, however, Ricardo indicated that countries would shift production toward their areas of comparative advantage. 287 Given the relative prices between the two regions,
food will soon be shipped from the U.S. to Europe and clothing from
Europe to the U.S. The penetration of clothing into the U.S. market will
cause clothing prices to fall and some U.S. clothing manufacturers to be
driven out of business. Likewise, European farmers will suffer losses
from the import of American food. The net result will be an equalization
of relative prices. The exact prices cannot be determined without knowing the exact supply and demand for the goods. However, Ricardo
proved that the final price will be somewhere between the U.S. price ratio of 1/2 for food to clothing and the European price ratio of
288

3/4

for these

same goods.
The overall effect is that the U.S. will benefit from imported clothing
costing less than that produced at home, and Europe will benefit from
consuming food that is less expensive than domestically produced food.
The advantage is best seen by examining the real wages before and after
trade. Before trade, a worker in the U.S. had to work 3 hours to get one
unit of food and one unit of clothing. Assume that the new price ratio is
2/3 (a number between the previous U.S. ratio of 1/ and the Europe ratio
of 3/4) and so food in the U.S. now costs $2 and clothing $3. Under this
287. Id.
288. Id. at 690.
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scenario, a U.S. worker still has to work one hour to buy a unit of food,
but need work only 11/ hours to buy one unit of European clothing.
Therefore, the same bundle of goods costs the U.S. worker only 21h hours
of work, a real gain of 20%.
Under the same scenario, a European worker had to work 7 hours
before trade to purchase the bundle of goods. After trade, the same
worker must still work four hours to purchase a unit of clothing. However, to produce a unit of food, a European worker would only need to
produce 2/3 of a unit of clothing (2/3 x 4 hours of labor), or 2 2/3 hours of
work. This means the total work to purchase the bundle of goods for a
European worker is 6 2/3 hours (4 + 2 2/3), or 5% less than before.
The bottom line is that Ricardo proved both regions would benefit if
they specialized in their areas of comparative advantage-that is, if the
U.S. specialized in the production of food, while Europe specialized in
the production of clothing.2 89 Only free trade allows the flow of goods
and services necessary to produce these advantages.
The illustration above demonstrated that both countries benefited
from free trade, but critics might point out that the U.S. benefited more
because of its absolute advantage to begin with. It is true that the U.S.
benefited by a greater percentage; however, larger countries consume
more than smaller countries. When relative consumption is factored in, it
turns out smaller countries actually gain more from free trade than larger
countries. 290 They "affect world prices the least and therefore can trade
291
at world prices that are very different from domestic prices."
Economists have also determined that comparative advantage may
be extended to many countries without altering the underlying principle.
"As far as a single county is concerned, all the other nations can be
lumped together into one group as 'the rest of the world."' 292 The more
countries involved, the more efficient the trade. Thus, multilateral trade
293
is more efficient than bilateral trade.
The monetary principle remains the same as well when the number
of goods and services is increased beyond the two in the illustration. Exactly where the comparative advantages lie depends, of course, on the
demands and supplies of various goods. 2 9 4 Thus, comparative advantages
are constantly shifting as the world market shifts.
Samuelson and Nordhaus do note, however, two qualifications to the
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 690-691.
Id. at 693.
Id.
Id. at 695.
See id.
Id. at 694.
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theory of comparative advantage. 295 The first is that the theory "assumes
a smoothly working competitive economy with flexible prices and wages
and no involuntary unemployment. 2 96 When workers are laid off in one
industry or region due to comparative advantages, they often do not
297
"flow" to the creation of new jobs in other industries, or other regions.
This creates inefficiencies. The changes that the theory brings often cause
"underutilized labor and capital" to lobby to protect their interests from
foreign competitors.2 98 As a result, the theory is not very popular during
down times, such as when "high tariff walls" were erected during the
Great Depression. 299 Samuleson and Nordhaus warn that "[w]hen an
economy is in depression or the price system malfunctions, we cannot be
sure that countries will gain from trade or that the theory of comparative
300
advantage will hold in every case."
The second related qualification is that comparative advantage is
good for nations, but not always good for every "individual, firm, sector,
or factor of production. ' 30 1 "Recent studies indicate that unskilled labor
in high-income countries has in the last two decades suffered reductions
in real wages because of the increased imports of goods in related industries from low-wage developing countries. '30 2 However, Samuelson and
Nordhaus conclude that "[tihe theory of comparative advantage shows
'30 3
that other sectors will gain more than the injured sectors will lose.
Moreover, the economists note that labor always takes a period of time to
gravitate toward better opportunities, so the disadvantages must be
viewed long term. Thus, despite the theory's drawbacks, Samuelson and
Nordhaus conclude that "[n]ations that disregard competitive advantage
pay a heavy price in terms of their living standards and economic
30 4
growth."
B.

THE REALITIES AND EFFECTS OF CHAPTER

11

BANKRUPTCIES IN

THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY

Some argue that Chapter 11 bankruptcy harms the industry by placing undue stress on other competitors when a failing airline is allowed to
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
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Id. at 696.
Id.
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continue operations under bankruptcy protection. 30 5 When the financial
obligations of these companies are reduced by reorganization it obviously
results in lower operational costs. These airlines could then undercut
ticket prices of healthy competitors, theoretically causing financial hardship for them as well. The relative moderateness of the reorganization
plans imposed enables these defunct airlines to operate ineffectively for
lengthened time periods; this further discourages economic growth in an
industry already plagued by financial problems.
Daniel Rollman examined these theories and presents the argument
that Chapter 11 bankruptcies act as a deterrent to the invisible hand of
the market's supply and demand function: "[b]ecause Chapter 11 does
not permit an airline to fail despite its performance and the economics of
the industry, there will be excessive price competition and a generally
unhealthy unsustainable economic environment. ' 30 6 He also uses the
theory of prominent commentators Douglas Baird and Thomas Jackson
to support his findings that, "the availability of bankruptcy reorganization
causes industries to experience excessive and unhealthy competition because the industry retains an inefficiently large number of
competitors.

30 7

However, recent empirical studies find no indication that these bankrupt carriers actually reduce or undercut ticket prices: numerous studies
by the government accounting office, culminating in a 2005 report, have
examined the effects of Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on healthy airlines and the industry overall.30 8 This report cites numerous other empirical and academic studies summarizing that airline bankruptcy does not
create negative effects on capacity, traffic, individual airports, or the in30 9
dustry as a whole.
The National Bureau of Economic Research has also addressed this
question. The Bureau investigated the pricing strategies of bankrupt airlines and their competitors. No evidence was presented to support that
competitors to bankrupt airlines lower their prices or that they lose pas310
sengers to bankrupt rivals.
Even if the filings are not detrimental to the overall health of the
industry, they are harmful to pension plan participants and the Pension
305. See Alfred E. Kahn, Change, Challenge, and Competition: A Review of the Airline Commission Report, REG.: THE CATO REV. OF Bus. & GOV'T, Fall 1993.
306. Daniel P. Rollman, Flying Low: Chapter11's Contribution to the Self-Destructive Nature
of Airline Industry Economics, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 404 (2004).

307. Id. at 413.
308.

See Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 3.

309.

See Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 3.

310.

Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, Do Airlines in Chapter11 Harm Their Rivals? 20

(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5047, 1995).
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Benefit Guaranty Company (PBGC).31 1 Recent SEC filings of legacy
carriers show airline defined benefit pensions to be underfunded by approximately $13.7 billion, which is down from $21 billion at the end of
2004.312 The reduction is based primarily on the shedding of liability
through bankruptcy provisions that allow some debt to be released, and
some debt to be satisfied by the PBGC. 3 13 In the last three years alone,
the PBGC has taken over $24.9 billion of liability from US Airways and
3 14
United - at a "cost of over $9.7 billion to the agency.
Congress is attempting reform, with three main proposals that would
strengthen the defined benefit pension system in the long term by 1) adjusting the evaluation of pension assets and liabilities, 2) increasing
PBGC premiums, 3) restricting lump-sum distributions from the plans,
and 4) changing the disclosure requirements of the participating
3 15
companies.
While the airlines with Chapter 11 status might not directly harm the
industry or its competitiveness, most agree that it would be a benefit if
these companies were at least liquidated more quickly or taken over by
3 16
more efficient and successful carriers.
C.

INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS

OF

U.S.

AIRLINES

Airlines worldwide have faced many challenges in the aftermath of
the attacks on September 11, 2001. In an industry that had already faced
numerous bankruptcies and changes, the decreased passenger travel, increased regulations, and rising jet fuel prices affected U.S. and foreign
carriers alike. 317 But the ability of low-cost carriers in the U.S. to succeed
and profit amidst these and other significant obstacles 3 18 are an indication
of U.S. potential for success in open domestic competition against foreign
carriers.
311. Commercial Aviation: Preliminary Observations on Legacy Airlines' Financial Conditions, Bankruptcy, and Pension Issues, Before the Comm. on Transportationand Infrastructure,
Subcomm. on Aviation, 3 (2005) [hereinafter Hearings](statement of JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues & Barbara D. Bovjberg, Director, Education, Workforce, and
Income Security Issues).
312. See Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 37.
313. See Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 37.
314. See Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 3.
315. See Pension Problems, supra note 205, at 57.
316. See generally Barriersto Entry Continue in Key Markets, supra note 26, at 7 (citing THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AIRLINE INDUSTRY, A REPORT TO

(Aug. 1993)).
317. See generally Press Release, LUFTHANSA, Lufthansa Lifts Nine-Month Operating Result
to 471 Million Euros, LUFTHANSA, Nov. 11, 2005, http://konzem.lufthansa.com/en/html/presse/
(discussing
pressemeldungen/index.html?c=nachrichten/appshow/en/2005/11/514/HOM&s=O
Lufthansa's operating results and positive financial forecast).
318. See Hearings, supra note 311, at 7.
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The key to an airline's profitability lies in unit cost competitiveness. 31 9 As discussed above, low unit costs, such as those maintained by
low cost U.S. airlines, deliver a significant comparative advantage. 320
Low cost airlines' competitive advantage in 2004 was 2.7 cents per average seat mile over legacy airlines due to their ability to keep overall costs
low and maintain greater labor and asset productivity. 321 Although legacy airlines have worked to reduce costs since 2001, their focus on capacity reduction has little effect on unit costs and their overall
competitiveness. 322 The drastic difference is illustrated below:
LEGACY VS.

Low

COST AIRLINE UNIT COST DIFFERENTIAL

323

When evaluating the potential for U.S. and foreign carriers' success
in an open market, the regulations imposed by individual nations will directly affect each airline's unit cost. For example, in February 2004, the
European Union adopted Regulation 261/2004, which imposes common
rules of compensating and assisting passengers who are denied boarding
or whose flights are delayed or cancelled. 324 The response from the industry was litigation challenging the appropriateness of all aspects of the
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Press Release, THE INT'L AIR TRANSP. Assoc., IATA Challenges EU on Flawed

Regulation Airlines Can't Make the Sunshine, 8IATA, Apr. 21, 2004, available at http://www.iata

.org/pressroom/pr/2004/2004-04-21-01.htm (discussing IATA's application for judicial review
challenging new EU Regulation 261/2004).
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legislation, which would increase liability and costs. 32 5
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States should aggressively pursue cabotage agreements
with foreign governments and in particular with the EEC. Such agreements should be reciprocal in principle, offering cabotage rights in the
U.S. equal in terms of mileage or other agreed upon benchmark in exchange for equal rights in the foreign country participating in the
agreement.
The adoption of cabotage with whomever it can be negotiated should
be combined with domestic policies opening up domestic airport gates
and resources and slots to all who seek entry, whether new entrants or
incumbent foreign carriers.
All foreign airlines granted cabotage rights should be required to satisfy all safety and regulatory and security requirements currently imposed
on U.S. carriers, as well as additional security requirements deeded necessary under Homeland Security laws.

325. See id

